

Dr K Nageshwar Rao MD
Chief Medical Officer
Indigo



Tenerife 27 Mar 1977



**Hudson River 2009** 




PAN\_AM 1736



# Human Error

Are they similar?
Can practices translate across industries?





# @IndiGo

- The Management
- The Pilot/ flight crev
- The employees
- The Policies

Safety Management System







# **Safety Culture**









 Safety Management System focuses on the safety, human and organizational aspects of an organization (i.e. safety satisfaction)

 Quality Management System focuses on the products and services of an organization (i.e. customer satisfaction)





- Sortie Preparation
- BA Test
- Preflight papers
- Fuel Calculations
- Preflight briefing
- Preflight checks
- Check Lists
- Standardised Communication
- Sterile cockpit
- Post flight Checks





# **The Checklist Culture**

1935 – B-17 "The flying fortress"

THE END OF THE MASTER BUILDER 59

component became further specialized and split off, until there were architects on one side, often with their own areas of subsequences on another, with their various kinds of expertise; the builders, too, fragmented into their own multiple divisions, ranging from tower crane contractors to finish carpenters. The field looked, in other words, a lot like medicine, with all yet we in medicine.

Yet we in medicine continue to exist in a system created in the Master Builder era a system in which a lone Master Physician with a prescription pad, an operating room, and a few people to follow his lead plans and executes the entirety of care for a patient, from diagnosis through treatment. We've been slow to adapt to the reality that, for example, a third of patients have at least ten specialist physicians actively involved in their care by their last year of life, and probably a score more personnel, ranging from nurse practitioners and physician assistants to pharmacists and home medical aides. And the evidence of how slow we've been to adapt is the extraordinarily high rate at which care in the construction business, Salvia explained, such failure is designing.

-Faltibility of human memory to mundane & routine matters blood loss everyone should be prepared for whether t blood loss everyone snowa or prepared for whether to denise of Manuel the denise of Manuel to the Manuel to the denise of Manuel to the Manuel to the denise of Manuel to the denise of Manuel to the Manuel to the denise of the denise o Adam risks or concerns the team should know about the street of Master. Remick had never heard about the demise of Master.

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
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
### **CRM**

#### **Crew Resource Management**

Leadership
Situational Awareness
Aeronautical decision making
Communication
Stress management












# **Accident Causation**










# FRMS


- Predictive
- Proactive
- Reactive







FDTL



#### 6.1 Daily maximum flight time limitations during any 24 consecutive hours:

Crew Complement	Maximum Flight Time Limitation/ Max Number of Landings*	
Two-Pilot Operations	8 hours/ up to 6 landings	
	For day operations 9 Hours/up to 3 landings	
	For night operations 9 Hours/up to 2 landings	

<sup>\*</sup> Maximum Number of Landings is further dependent on Flight Duty Period.

#### 6.2 Cumulative flight time limitations

Cumulative Period	Flight Time Limitation (Hours)
In 7 consecutive days	35
In 30 consecutive days	125
In 365 consecutive days	1000

#### 6.3 Maximum Daily Flight Duty Period – Two Pilot Operations

6.3.1 Maximum Daily Flight Duty period for two pilot operation shall be as per the following table:

Maximum Dally Flight Duty Period (FDP) Limitation**	Maximum Number of landings	Maximum Filght Time Limitation
12.5 hours	2 for night operations	9 hours
	3 for day operations	0.110-4110
12 hours	4	
11.5 hours	5	8 hours
11 hours	6	

<sup>&</sup>quot; Reduction of Flight duty period due to operation in WOCL.





### LOSA



- "Threats, errors and undesirable states".
  - "NO-JEOPARDY CONDITIONS"
  - Potential threats to safety;
  - How the threats are addressed;
  - The errors such threats generate;
  - How flight crews manage these errors;
  - Specific behaviours that have been known to be associated with accidents and incidents





### **Preventive Care**

- Crew Medicals
  - Flight Crew
  - Cabin Crew

Civil Aviation Requirements, Section 7, Series "C", Part I dated 26th August, 1999







# Pre Flight Medical Check



CIVIL AVIATION REQUIREMENTS
SECTION 2 – AIRWORTHINESS
SERIES 'F', PART III,
ISSUE II, DATED 25TH NOVEMBER 2014

Revised: Nov 2016



# The Take Aways

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- Crew Resource Management
- Protocols & briefings
- Checklist culture
- Fatigue Management/ FDTL
- Presurgery Breath Alcohol check???
- Line Oriented Safety Audit

.....Food for thought



• .....Happy Landings

